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IN THE UNITED S'I'ATES DISTRIC'I' COURT FOR THE 
EASTEPJ.\! DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
HIR.A1·1 G. HILL JR. r 
ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER and 
DONALD S. COHEN 
v. 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 
CIV. 3-76-48 
0 R D E R 
For the reasons stated in an Opinion As 
Rendered From The Bench and this day passed to the 
Clerk of the Court, it is ORDERED Jchat plaintiffs' 
motion for a prelirninary injunction be, and the 
same hereby is, denied and that. TVA's motion to 
dismiss at this time be, and the same hereby is, 
likewise denied. 
Enter: 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NORTHERJ:il DIVISION 
HIRA14 G. HILL, JR., 
ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER and 
DONALD S. COHEN 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 
CIV. 3-76-48 
OPINION ll1S RENDERED FRO.M ':'HE BENCH 
Arguments on each side have been informative and 
interesting and show careful consideration by counsel of the 
legal and factual questions that are involved. Counsel 
only agree on one thing, and that is the rules to be followed 
by a trial court in issuing or denying a Jcemporary 
injunction. 
These rules, which have been stated and discussed 
by respective counsel, are as follows: 
1. The moving party has raised a substantial 
question on the merits of the lawsuit; 
2. The moving party has demonstrated a probability 
of success on the merits; 
3. The injury that will be suffered by the 
moving party ·vJi thout preliminary relief lS 
irreparable and outweighs the resulting 
harm to his adversary; and 
4. Judicial consideration of the public 
interes-t. 
Plaintiffs seek a temporary and permanent 
injunction to stop the construction of the Tellico 
Project. This is the third time the Project has been 
in litigation in this Court as indicated by counsel during 
the argument. In the firsi: case, ~che plaintiffs contested 
the building of the dart: because of an insufficient impact 
statement. The Court heau:l extensive proof at that hearing 
and heard Dr. Etnier testify at length about the species 
of fish known as darters. 
In t.hat first case, the Court issued a temporary 
injunction which prohibited further work on the dam because 
of an ina.dequate impac-t statement. 
As indicated by counsel, that case went to the 
court of F.ppeals and was affirmed; thereafter, the TVA 
amended its impact statement. The amendment caused a 
se~ond hearing at which time the Court heard detailed 
proof about tha-t impact statement. 
The court, after extensive proof and arguments 
of counsel, held that the impact. statement complied with 
-2-
the provisions of the National Environmental Protection 
Act. Thereupon, the plaintiffs in that case appealed 
to the Court of Appeals and, as also stated by counsel, 
that decision was likewise affirmed. 
Section 1536 of the Endangered Species Act of 
1973 (16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1543) provides, in pertinent 
part, that all Federal agencies 
tl1at 
"shall ff in consultation with and with ·the 
assistance of the Secretary, utilize their 
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of 
this chapter by. . taking such action 
necessary to insure that actions authorized, 
funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize 
the continued existence of. . endangered species 
and threatened species or result in the des-
truction or modification of habitat of such 
species which is determined by the Secretary, after 
consultation as appropriate with the affected 
states, to be critical." 
The legislative history of this section states 
'' [a] 11 agencies, departments and other 
strumentalities of the Federal government 
are directed to cooperate in the implementation 
of the goals of this Act." 
S.Rep.No. 93-307, 93rd 
Cong., lst Sess., 2 U.S.Code 
Cong.& Admin. News, p. 2997. 
On October 9, 1975, the Secretary of the 
Interior de·terro.ined that the snail darter was an endangered 
species, that its habitat, the Little Tennessee Riveru was 
critical to its survival or destruction, and noted that 
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'' [t]he proposed impoundment of water behind the 
proposed Tellico Dam would result in total destruction 
of the Snail Darter 1 s habitat." Exhibit A to the 
Complaint. Iri reaching this conclusion the Secretary 
of the Interior considered the objections of T.V.A. to 
listing the snail darter on the Endangered Species 
List. Some of the objections raised and apparently 
rejected by the Secretary are as follows: 
1. The snail darter is not a new and distinct 
species; 
2. No present threat to the snail darter exists 
since there is scientific opinion that it 
exists in other parts of the Tennessee River 
System; 
3. TVA and others are undertaking a scientifically 
recognized progra.'ll ·to conserve the snail 
darter; 
4. The Fish and vHldlife Service of the Deparbl!ent 
of Interior should not inject i·tself into "the 
longstanding controversy surrounding the wisdom 
of the Tellico Project." The federal courts 
have already passed on the sufficiency of TVA 1 s 
impact statement which considered undescribed 
species of darters; 
5. Impoundment of the lake is set for January l977i 
6. Congress continues to fund the project~ and 
7. There "is no scientific basis to support 
listing the snail darter, there is no 
environmental need for such action, and that 
nothing positive would be accomplished." 
In spite of the objections made by TVA, the 
Secretary placed the snail darter on the Endangered 
Species List. 
The only case found by this Court which 
deals w~th an entity of the federal government as a 
defendant was Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 392 F.Supp. 130 
(E.D.Mo. 1975). In that case 1 the plaintiff alleged 
that the construction of a certain da.TU by the Army. 
Corps of Engineers would modify or destroy the habitat 
of the Indiana Bat. The District Judge held, among other 
things, that the Corps of Engineers 1 activities had not 
resulted in harassing or endangering the Indiana Bat. 
The Court also found that when the lake was impounded, no 
caves presently inhabited by the bats would be affected, even 
if the lake v1ere not impounded, the Indiana Ba·t faced 
extinction within fifteen or twenty years. 392 F.Supp. 
at 144. The trial judge declined to interfere with the 
construction of the dam and found as a fact that the 
rcorps of Engineers has been, and is, making all possible 
reasonable good faith efforts to comply 'dith the provisions 
of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. 11 392 F.Supp. at 138. 
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That decision is now pending in ·the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit. Counsel for plaintif%also 
mentioned the case of United States v. Cappaert, 508 
F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974). We have examined that case and 
are of the opinion that the case dealt more with the 
enforcement of the Government's right to certain ground 
water than it dealt with enforcement of the Endangered 
Species Act. Counsel also mentioned an unreported case 
arising in the Southern District of Mississippi, but the 
Court has not had an opportunity to examine the opinion. 
In the present case, one of the issues is 
whether the TVA has taken "such action necessary to 
insure that" the impoundment of Tellico Lake does not 
"jeopardize the continued existence of" the snail darter 
"or result in the destruction or modification of habitat 
of such species which is determined by the Secretary . . . 
to be critical." 16 u.s.c. § 1536. 
The Secretary, as previously indicated, has 
determined that impoundment of the Tellico Lake would 
totally destroy the snail darter~s habitat. Thus, the 
Secretary's position is seemingly that if the Tellico 
Project is prosecuted to completion the snail darter 
will be rendered extinct. 
Plaintiffs allege that TVA is attempting to 11 take" 
the snail darter in violation of Title 16 § 1538(a) (1} (B) 
and (G) , and that such violation may be enjoined pursuant 
to 16 u.s.c. § 1540(g) (l) (A). 
The plaintiffs 1 argumen~cs in support of the 
motion for a temporary injunction may be sununarized 
as follm.-Js: 
(1) That plaintiffs will be irreparably 
harmed if the snail darter is rendered 
extinct by the actions o£ TVA in bulldozing 
and clear-cutting trees which may destroy 
the critical habitat of the darter before 
the case can be heard on the merits; and 
(2) the public interest requires preservation 
of this endangered species. 
The arguments in opposition to ·the motion are 
set forth in definitive form in the brief of the TVA .. 
The first point TVA makes in that connection is that the 
Court does not have jurisdiction of the case because proper 
notice was not given to it or to the Secretary of the 
Interior in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 
See 16 u.s.c. § 1540(g) (2) (A) (i). 
·rhe Secretary of the Interior and TVA received 
notice more than 60 days before the suit was filed. 
TVA 1 s arg~~ent is highly technical and, in the opinion 
of the Court, it is lacking in merit. If such a defense 
were plausible this Court \vould hesitate to base a 
decision on such a procedural technicality rather than 
on the merits of the case. 
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'rhe second argument made by TVA. is that the 
Endangered Species Act does not apply to the Tellico 
Project. It is assumed that TVA in·tends to convey i:he 
idea that the Act is net retroactive and that the 
Congress did not intend for it to apply to projects 
begun before the Act was passed. 
The Tellico Project was started or discussed 
as early as 1967 and, with the exception of the 
interruptions caused by the courts, has continued toward 
completion since that time. 
In the opinion of the Court, the Endangered 
Species Act does apply to the Tellico Project; but whether 
or not Congress intended the Endangered Species Act t6 
permit the halting of the Tellico Project after approxi-
mately sao-million has been spent on it is another question, 
a question that will not be decided by the Court at this 
time. 
The Court will give the parties an opportunity, 
if they desire, to present proof on the merits of the case 
a·t which time :furJcher discussion of this point as r,,7ell as 
several other points in the brief will be heard. 
In this connection, if the parties take advantage 
o:f a hearing on the merits, the Court expects them to 
stipulate as many facts as possible and to formulate wi·th 
clarity the disputed questions of fact, if any. At.this 
point, it appears to the Court that the decision on the 
merits will turn on questions of law rather than on questions 
of fact. 
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The Court cannot say at this time that 
plaintiffs have demonstrated a probability of success 
on the merits. The Court is of the opinion that this 
is highly doubtful. Nor can the court find at this time 
that the injury which plaintiffs will suffer unless a 
preliminary injunction is granted outweighs the harm that 
would result to TVA. 
During the argument the Court was advised by 
counsel that the prior injunction issued by this Court 
cost the TVA approximately $15 million, an amount which 
was shocking to the Court. As indicated, the Court cannot 
find at this time that the injury to plaintiffs would 
outweigh the harm to TVA if a temporary injunction vJ"ei.-e 
to be issued. 
Of course, the public interest is involved in 
this case. The plaintiffs are interested in preserving 
the environment_. The TVA says that it is likewise 
inJcerested in the environment, but says -the harm that 
would be done by the issuance of an injunction would 
greatly outweigh the good that it would do plaintiffs and 
' 
other citizens of the United States. i I 
The Court is of the opinion and finds that 
the issuance of a temporary injunction cannot be justified 
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on the present record. 
Accordinglyr plaintiffs' motion is denied. 
Order Accordingly. 
